Stavroula Tsitsiri, BA Department of International, European and Regional Studies of Panteion University / MSc in Southeast European Studies: Politics, History, Economics, NKUA
Over the past fifteen years, bilateral relations between Serbia and China have been structured primarily on a strategic foundation, as demonstrated by the large number of agreements signed between the two countries. Since 2009, when the two countries initiated cooperation in areas such as economic development, security, technology, and infrastructure, China’s influence in Serbia has significantly increased. A formal strategic partnership was announced in 2016, and from 2017 onward, the removal of visa requirements and the intensification of political coordination have further deepened bilateral ties. This alignment of Serbia’s foreign policy with China has coincided with the consolidation of power by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and President Aleksandar Vučić. Strategic cooperation in foreign policy, defense and military affairs, internal security, and infrastructure investment has contributed to a deterioration in democratic standards in Serbia, with direct implications for the country’s European Union (EU) accession process —particularly regarding chapters related to democracy and the rule of law.
In the field of foreign policy, Serbia has managed to balance and leverage its position between Western actors (the European Union, the United States, and NATO) and other global powers, primarily China and Russia. One of the main points of convergence in foreign policy matters between Serbia and China is the shared emphasis on independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international security. Particularly, China, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, plays a significant role for Serbia as a guardian of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly through its consistent support for UNSC Resolution 1244. China also backs Serbia’s stance on the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia, in turn, engages in high-level cooperation with China, with President Aleksandar Vučić regularly participating in summits and maintaining close ties with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Thus, despite its status as an EU candidate country, Serbia often diverges from the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially regarding China. Serbia has notably declined to align with EU sanctions or to condemn China’s human rights violations or territorial aggressions. In this way, Serbia uses its relationship with China to offset EU demands concerning democratic reforms and the rule of law, as China offers unconditional support. According to the European Commission’s 2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia is considered moderately prepared in the area of common foreign, security, and defense policy. The same report highlights that no substantial progress has been made in this area; Serbia’s alignment pattern has remained largely unchanged, and some of its actions and statements were inconsistent with the EU’s foreign policy positions. This misalignment persisted even as Serbia deepened its ties with China, specifically through a strategic Free Trade Agreement that entered into force on 1 July 2024.
Sino-Serbian cooperation, within the broader framework of bilateral diplomatic relations, extends into the military and defense sectors. The two countries are developing a shared defense doctrine and maintain a neutral stance toward military-political alliances. According to Serbia’s 2009 National Security Strategy, China is identified as one of Serbia’s key international partners in defense and security, at a time when Serbia officially supported military neutrality and refrained from joining military alliances such as NATO. The intensification of military ties between Serbia and China has been reflected in the numerous exchanges of visits between representatives of their respective armed forces and Ministries of Defense since 2016, culminating in the signing of the Bilateral Military Cooperation Program in 2018. Key areas of this cooperation include counterterrorism and the procurement of Chinese weaponry through semi-secret agreements. The most visible manifestation of this growing cooperation has been the delivery of Chinese-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and surface-to-air missile systems. In June 2020, Serbia received six CH-92A UAVs produced by the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and 18 laser-guided FT-8C missiles. These were deployed during the first joint military exercise—entitled “Cooperation”—in 2020, which was attended by the Serbian President. Serbia thus became the first European country to deploy Chinese combat drones within its armed forces. China has also committed to transferring technological expertise to support Serbia’s domestic Pegasus drone program. In July 2020, the European Union expressed concerns over China’s delivery of armed UAVs to Serbia. Unlike UAVs and missiles produced by the U.S. or EU member states, Chinese systems are significantly cheaper and not subject to political conditionality, making them particularly attractive to Serbia’s president and ruling party. These deepening military ties with China are likely to further undermine democracy in Serbia. Most agreements between the two countries are negotiated behind closed doors, without parliamentary oversight, and are executed through government-to-government contracts that bypass competitive bidding processes. This became particularly evident in 2020 when President Vučić refused to disclose the cost of the CH-92A drones. Such practices are indicative of “corrosive capital,” a concept describing foreign investments or agreements that erode good governance and democratic institutions by fostering opaque transactions and political influence, in stark contrast to the regulatory frameworks and accountability standards demanded by the EU. Serbia’s alignment with China in the defense sector is thus viewed as a strategic counterbalance to EU pressure for democratization, enabling the country’s leadership to postpone or avoid substantive reforms.
In the domestic security sector, Serbia has established a strategic partnership with the Chinese semi-private company, Huawei, which has strong state backing, since 2007. Huawei is one of the Serbian government’s key partners in its efforts to digitally transform the country, particularly in the areas of research, innovation, and artificial intelligence. The company also maintains close ties with the state-owned Telekom Srbija. Since 2018, Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs has signed a cooperation agreement with Huawei to implement the “Safe City” program, which involves the installation of over 1,000 next-generation cameras at more than 800 locations in Belgrade by the end of 2020. This program includes an advanced surveillance system utilizing facial recognition software and license plate recognition, with the declared goal by the Minister of Internal Affairs to prevent crime and combat terrorism. However, this decision encountered resistance from civil society, as, according to Serbian law, the use of facial recognition software lacks a legal foundation. Despite the objections raised, the Ministry of Internal Affairs attempted to introduce a draft law that would provide a legal basis for the use of biometric surveillance systems nearly three years after the installation of the cameras. In doing so, privacy concerns and data collection issues were ignored, leading to a backlash from civil society, which forced the Minister of Internal Affairs to withdraw the draft law. Nevertheless, a year later, a second attempt was made to establish a legal framework for the use of facial recognition cameras. As in 2021, civil society’s opposition was strong, and the draft was withdrawn. Currently, Chinese-made cameras have been installed across the country, but due to the absence of a legal framework, facial recognition technology has yet to be utilized. Given the democratic backsliding observed in Serbia in recent years, human rights activists, NGOs, and other stakeholders have expressed concerns about the potential misuse of surveillance cameras, which could be employed by the government to suppress dissent and consolidate the power of the ruling elites. Furthermore, analysts and politicians from Western countries have expressed concerns about the possibility of Huawei’s cameras being used by China to export its authoritarian model and engage in espionage activities within Serbia. Regarding the European Union’s response, members of the European Parliament, fearing abuses by Serbian authorities, sent a letter to Serbia’s Minister of Internal Affairs to express their concerns and request further information about the installation of Huawei’s cameras. The potential future spread of the Chinese surveillance model may transform Serbia into an increasingly authoritarian regime, endangering its already slow and complex EU accession process, while also exacerbating the EU’s “fatigue” regarding enlargement in the Western Balkans.
In the economic domain, and specifically in infrastructure investment, Serbia has increasingly turned to China as a key partner, primarily due to the ease of securing financing. Under the 2009 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, a simplified framework was established for the implementation of infrastructure projects, effectively bypassing standard due diligence procedures. This approach has raised concerns regarding the transparency of the negotiation process, as the criteria for selecting Chinese firms remain unclear, including whether alternative bids were considered or if the Chinese proposals were indeed the most economically advantageous for Serbia. The absence of comprehensive oversight by national institutions and the lack of formal investigations have further fueled speculation about possible corrupt practices. Thus the concentration of power and the erosion of democratic institutions in Serbia have enabled domestic actors to align with China in the absence of sufficient checks and balances. According to Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom in the World report, the Serbian government has faced persistent criticism for its lack of transparency in matters such as public procurement and infrastructure development. The report also notes that Serbia’s Law on Public Procurement was not applied in the case of the Moravski Corridor highway construction, carried out by Chinese companies. Government-to-government agreements constitute the primary vehicle for Serbia–China cooperation, whereby China builds partnerships and negotiates directly with ruling parties and administrative bodies—a process that is subject to minimal institutional scrutiny. This strategy creates ample opportunities for corruption and stands in contrast to the European Union’s policy framework, which promotes open and transparent public procurement processes. Additionally, Serbian lawmakers are afforded limited opportunities to question government activities or legislation, and the majority of parliamentary inquiries remain unanswered by the executive. Amid growing illiberal tendencies and authoritarian drift within Serbia, the Chinese model—characterized by unconditional, low-interest loans for infrastructure projects that are not subject to good governance requirements—has emerged as an appealing alternative. Unlike EU loans, which come with an extensive list of prerequisites including transparency, fair labor standards, and financial sustainability, Chinese financing does not impose such conditions.
In conclusion, the growing influence of China in Serbia—facilitated through a close strategic partnership across sectors such as the economy, infrastructure, technology, and security—has contributed to an alarming democratic backsliding in the country. Chinese support, which is largely free from the conditions and democratic values promoted by the European Union, offers Serbia’s political leadership alternative sources of financing and political legitimacy. This, in turn, weakens the pressure for reforms and accountability. As a result, power has become increasingly centralized, institutions have been undermined, and political freedoms curtailed. As repeatedly emphasized by the European Union, Serbia must align itself with European values and reinforce the rule of law if it wishes to maintain its credibility as an EU candidate country. Otherwise, a strategic shift toward authoritarian models of governance, such as that represented by China, risks distancing Serbia even further from its European trajectory.
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