Berlyn Kate Schelling
Since its founding after WWII, the European Union (EU) represents a unique project due to its status as a supranational organization. European states concede parts of their national sovereignty in order to join this union and reap the economic, social, and cultural benefits. With over 450 million inhabitants over 27 states with legally protected freedom of movement (1), the dynamics of national identities and a common European identity must be examined. The idea of a common European identity is largely a contemporary phenomenon, created after centuries of continental infighting which has only been restricted since the mid 20th century. Thus, the EU represents a significant player in the creation of a shared European identity which is necessary for the functioning and sustainability of the organization. Though a continent-wide European identity can be argued to exist, for the purposes of this article only MOSO member states of the European Union are considered.
The European Union began in 1951 as a steel and coal organization for six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The creation of a trade partnership was based upon the idea of conflict deterrence, as countries who have intertwined their economies are less likely to go to war with each other than those with separate systems. Six years later, the organization evolved into the European Economic Community, with five of the original six countries instituting the pillars of free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. Later on, through the Treaty of Rome, the organization expanded with the creation of institutions like the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty turned the European Economic Community into a union, which solidified the idea of EU citizenship (2). As the EU expanded to allow for greater civilian involvement and democratic participation, this has furthered the concept of a shared European identity among citizens in the member states.
In order to explore the dynamics of European identity in member states it must be defined and understood as a values-based identity, as explained in various founding treaties. These values include a respect for freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law, as well as principles of tolerance and non-discrimination. In theory, an EU-promoted common identity must also include a respect for national identities and plurality. Quoting scholar Lucien Jaume, Chopin explains that, “This identity involves finding a middle road between the global and the local, between dilution and self-withdrawal, to avoid, as much as possible, a brutal confrontation between world interdependence and blind, xenophobic, sterile isolation (3).” This concept of duality is important to consider, and this plurality of identities is present in some EU countries more than others.
In 2004, the Czech Republic was one of ten countries which joined the EU (4). Over the last two decades of membership, Czech citizens’ satisfaction with EU membership has varied. In 2024, surveyors asked participating Czechs, “Overall, are you personally satisfied with our membership of the European Union?”. To this question, 51% responded in the affirmative. Though a rather low percentage, this is improved from 2016 where only 35% of respondents were satisfied with Czech EU membership amidst the migration crisis. Respondents often acknowledged the positives of belonging to the EU for its freedom of movement, though they cited the perceived overstep of the organization into national decision making as a negative (5). When it comes to European identity, 72% of Czech respondents to a 2025 survey identified as European, though less are sympathetic to the EU as an organization (6).
According to Professor Don Sparling, Czechs embody a European identity and culture. Sparling cites several important events in European history as occurring on Czech lands, such as the beginning of the Thirty Years War in Prague and Czechoslovakia as being the first to fall victim to Nazi expansion during WWII. Through this history, the European and Czech identities seem to reinforce one another, as evident by Professor Sparling’s statement that, “…there’s virtually nothing in European culture, history, and politics which hasn’t passed through this Czech ‘sieve’, if you want to put it that way (7).” This supports the idea that a national identity and European identity do not need to be in conflict with each other, but can be complementary.
Croatia represents a contrasting case to the Czech Republic. The most recent EU state and the 28th member until Brexit in 2020, Croatia is one of two Balkan countries in the union. Support for the EU is high, as evidenced by a 2025 survey showing that 79% of respondents thought Croatia benefited from their membership.8 For Croatians, being European represents modernity, economic prosperity, and a respect for individual autonomy. However, Croatian Eurosceptic parties have stoked fears around the erosion of Croatian identity (9). Having only achieved independence as a nation-state in 1991 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, this has fueled concerns around the loss of national identity to a larger European identity.
When compared to the Czech case, where national identity and European identity can complement each other, the opposite is true of Croatia. A European Commission-funded project on identity and modernity found that in Croatian political discourse, “…the European aspect, according to the case study, was prone to manipulation by political actors in their efforts to define Croatian distinctiveness (10).” In this small Balkan country with a history of subjugation to the Yugoslav bloc, concerns around identity dissolution can restrict Croatians from also identifying as European. This was evident in a 2015 Eurobarometer survey, which found that 30% of Croatian respondents identified themselves only as Croatian and a further 63% identified first as their national identity and second as European (11).
When looking at the variation in identification among these two EU MOSO countries, it is important to explore how a common European identity can be promoted in these smaller nations. First, expanding the education of foreign languages, especially the less commonly spoken languages like Czech and Croatian, in the EU may help citizens identify more with those in other member states. Scholar Timothy Garton Ash states, “…the heart of the democratic problem in Europe, it is not Brussels, it’s Babel,” showcasing the importance of multilingualism for a European identity. Included in the education of young EU citizens should also be an inclusive approach to teaching history, with care not to overlook national histories and historic conflicts among European nations (12). This can assist in a more complementary and pluralistic cultural identification that focuses not only on the differences between European nations but also on their historic similarities. Additionally, education for elder populations on the benefits of EU membership could increase support for the organization among a demographic which have lived most of their lives outside of the EU and experienced firsthand the historical tension among certain European nations.
Ultimately, the European Union should do more to promote a shared European identity as it is in their political interest. The organization’s current Cohesion Policy includes increasing awareness of EU projects and their outcomes, as well as advertising the economic benefits of EU membership. Emphasizing the economic factor would be a strategic angle, as this is a primary motivator for EU accession. In the case of Croatia in 2005, prior to membership, 79% of Croatian citizens cited economic development as a main benefit of EU member status.13 When it comes to existing EU Cohesion Policy, there is a positive correlation between the policy and an increase in the numbers of citizens who identify with a European identity, though this is largely a cognitive identification rather than an emotional attachment to Europe (14). Regardless, in order to aid in EU political cohesion, the promotion of a shared European identity is crucial.
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