Berlyn Kate Schelling

 

Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European countries have documented a rapid increase in Russian hybrid warfare operations. These operations have developed to focus less on physical attacks in order for the country to maintain plausible deniability and avoid escalation. However, more pernicious and subtle methods have been embraced.1 Election interference is particularly insidious, as it targets the integrity of democratic processes and damages public trust in electoral systems. Across Eastern Europe, these countries have much lower levels of trust in national political bodies than those from Northern and Western Europe.2 Russian hybrid warfare tactics target these vulnerabilities, which occurred in the post-Soviet countries of Moldova and Romania during their most recent national elections.

Moldova has been quickly moving towards European Union member status for the past few years. The country has held European Union candidate status since 2022, has been in accession negotiations since 2023, and enshrined pro-EU goals into its constitution in 2024.3 This turn away from closer relations with Moscow towards EU member-state status has made the country of particular focus for Russian interference. In 2024, the Moldovan presidential elections saw heightened foreign interference, with experts estimating that Russia had spent around €200 million on influencing these results. These efforts failed, as the pro-EU president Maia Sandu was reelected and the EU integration constitutional referendum passed.4

In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found, “…serious cases of foreign interference, illicit financing, cyber-attacks, and widespread disinformation.” These attacks were credibly identified as coming from the Russian Federation, which was also found to have sponsored vote-buying schemes in the run-up to the election.5 Other tactics of interference included cyber-attacks on voting systems which attempted to disconnect local polling stations and those outside of the country that were set up for the Moldovan diaspora.6 Most pertinent, though, was the attempt to manufacture dissent and instability among the society. The Moldovan business man Ilan Shor, who is notably pro-Russia, offered Moldovan citizens around €2,500 a month to engage in anti-government protests ahead of the parliamentary elections.7 Paying for protestors, especially to citizens who have some of the lowest annual incomes in Europe, coupled with allegations of fraudulent votes from Moldovans abroad clearly aimed to undermine the integrity of the electoral system and to build institutional distrust. Despite this investment in moving Moldova away from Brussels, election results gave a decisive victory to the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity which won 54.5% of the vote and now holds a majority of seats in parliament.8 However, Moldova is not the only country to experience high levels of Russian interference in Eastern Europe.

Moldova’s neighbor also experienced notable Russian interference in 2024 and 2025, which ultimately forced the annulment of election results. The first round of Romanian presidential elections in late November 2024 saw the win of the previously little-known politician Călin Georgescu. Prior to the election, the far-right populist was polling in the single digits but by election day held 23% of the vote. Georgescu was originally certified as the winner of the first round of elections but on December 6th, 2024, the Romanian Constitutional Court cancelled the runoff elections. This was attributed to declassified documents from Romanian intelligence services which showed irregular campaign financing. Investigations showed that over 100 influencers on TikTok and other platforms were paid to promote Georgescu, though the politician reported that no money was spent on the campaign. This financial discrepancy, along with the extensive use of AI-generated content and bots to artificially boost content, led Romanian intelligence to conclude that the Georgescu campaign was, “…coordinated by a state actor.” 9

After the cancellation of the second round of elections, Georgescu was prevented from running again as he was under investigation by authorities. New elections were held May 2025 between the pro-EU mayor of Bucharest Nicușor Dan and the right-wing populist George Simion. The cancellation of Georgescu’s win in the November 2024 elections led to increased scrutiny of the electoral process, with the Telegram CEO Pavel Durov attempting to influence votes through a message sent to all Romanians that use the messaging app. Durov alleged in the message that EU governments were pushing Telegram to, “…to silence conservative voices in Romania ahead of today’s presidential election.”10 Ultimately, voters turned up in their highest numbers since 1996 to elect the moderate candidate Nicușor Dan, who earned 53.8% of the vote.11
Documenting Moscow’s attempts to interfere with these elections requires an exploration of potential benefits for the actor if Euroskeptic and pro-Russian governments were to be elected. One benefit would be the geographically strategic position of these states for their cooperation with Western alliances such as the European Union and NATO. Romania is a member of the European Union, as well as a part of NATO which operates bases on the country’s soil. The country also has access to the Black Sea, and plays an important role in keeping commercial shipping lanes safe from foreign interference.12 Previously a part of an ultranationalist political party, Georgescu left in 2022 as the party disapproved of his anti-NATO and pro-Russian views.13 A Georgescu presidency, along with the recent gains made by far-right parties in parliament, would have likely led to closer relations with Russia and significantly decreased cooperation with NATO. As for Moldova, the country closely collaborates with NATO, though it is not an official member, but is on the fast track to EU membership. These two countries make up an important part of NATO’s Eastern flank and acts as a buffer against further Russian incursion onto the European continent.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 has drastically changed European security concerns and presents an increased threat for surrounding countries. Moldova and Romania are important partners in the fight against Russian occupation in Ukraine. Romania has supplied Ukraine with a Patriot missile system and trains their soldiers to fly F-16 airplanes.14 Moldova has been one of the top supporters of Ukraine and has taken in the largest amount of Ukrainian refugees per capita out of any other country, as well as imposing sanctions on Russia which it has received 100% of its gas supply from.15 Georgescu’s win would have meant a significant decrease or complete suspension of aid to Ukraine. The politician has openly repeated Russian narratives about the country, including his opinion that it is an “invented state.”16 Similar pro-Russian ideas and Euroskepticism were present in Alexandr Stoianoglo’s campaign against the pro-EU candidate. Stoianolgo was backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists, whose leader Igor Dodon has stated that the party, “…will put an end to foreign interests and NATO.”17

The rise of far-right populists like Georgescu, Stoianoglo, and Dodon in these countries often means they are ideal actors to be manipulated by foreign interests and to communicate for the Russian state in more subtle ways. However, they are also representative of political polarization that is making Moldova and Romania more unstable. In turn, maligned foreign actors can capitalize on these vulnerabilities. It is essential to study the presence of Russian interference in these smaller states in order to order for other European states to better defend against these tactics. Additionally, the presence of international election observers is necessary to guarantee honest elections and to restore faith in democratic electoral systems. Though they are often overlooked by larger states, Moldova and Romania represent essential components of the fight against Russian aggression.

 

References:

1 Seth G Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War against the West,” Csis.org (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 18, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west#h2-russian-strategy.

2 European Commission, “‘Enlightened Trust’ Could Be the Key to Healthy Democracies,” CORDIS | European
Commission, January 26, 2024,
https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/448714-enlightened-trust-could-be-the-key-to-healthy-democracies.

3 OSCE, “Election Observation Mission Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections, Statement of Preliminary
Findings and Conclusions,” September 28, 2025, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/7/597800_0.pdf, 4.

4 Leah Kieff and Romina Bandura, “Defending Democracy: Why Moldova’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections Matter,”
Csis.org (Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2025),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/defending-democracy-why-moldovas-2025-parliamentary-elections-matter.

5 OSCE, “Election Observation Mission,” 1.

6 PBS News, “Moldova’s Pro-Western President Wins Reelection in Runoff Shaken by Alleged Russian Meddling,”
PBS News, November 3, 2024,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/moldovas-pro-western-president-wins-reelection-in-runoff-shaken-by-allegedrussian-
meddling.

7 Reuters Staff, “Fugitive Moldovan Tycoon Offers $3,000 a Month to Anti-Government Protesters,” Reuters, August
11, 2025,
https://www.reuters.com/world/fugitive-moldovan-tycoon-offers-3000-month-anti-government-protesters-2025-08-1
1/.

8 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “IFES Election Guide | Elections: Moldovan Parliament 2025
General,” Electionguide.org, 2025, https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/4608/.

9 Valentina Pop, Marton Dunai, and Polina Ivanova, “How Russia-Backed Influencers Meddled in Romania’s Vote,”
Financial Times, December 9, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/4b00e7ec-2c79-4313-b012-4f09f436f3ed.

10 Tim Ross and Andrei Popoviciu, “Russian Interference Claims Hit Romania’s Critical Election on Voting Day,”
POLITICO, May 18, 2025,
https://www.politico.eu/article/high-early-turnout-as-romanians-vote-in-critical-election/.

11 Tim Ross, Carmen Paun, and Andrei Popoviciu, “Pro-EU Moderate Nicușor Dan Wins Romanian Presidential
Election Stunner,” POLITICO, May 18, 2025,
https://www.politico.eu/article/romanian-presidential-election-results-nicusor-dan-george-simion/.

12 Antonia Colibasanu, “Romania’s Electoral Crisis: A Blueprint for Defending Democracy – Foreign Policy
Research Institute,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 11, 2024,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/12/romanias-electoral-crisis-a-blueprint-for-defending-democracy/.

13 Christina Harward, “Likely Kremlin-Backed Election Interference against Romania Threatens Bucharest’s
Continued Support for Ukraine and NATO,” 2024,
https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Romania20special20edition20PDF_0.pdf, 1-3.

14 Harward, “Kremlin-Backed Election Interference against Romania.”

15 Leah Kieff, “Moldova’s Ukrainian Bilateral,” Csis.org (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/moldovas-ukrainian-bilateral.

16 Harward, “Kremlin-Backed Election Interference against Romania.”

17 Moldova’s pro-Russian parties unite to press for September election win | Reuters